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Schizophrenia is a complex neuropsychiatric disorder with variable symptomatology,
traditionally divided into positive and negative symptoms, and cognitive deficits. However,
the etiology of this disorder has yet to be fully understood. Recent findings suggest
that alteration of the basic sense of self-awareness may be an essential distortion of
schizophrenia spectrum disorders. In addition, extensive research of social and mentalizing
abilities has stressed the role of distortion of social skills in schizophrenia. This article aims
to propose and support a concept of a triple brain network model of the dysfunctional
switching between default mode and central executive network (CEN) related to the
aberrant activity of the salience network. This model could represent a unitary mechanism
of a wide array of symptom domains present in schizophrenia including the deficit of self
(self-awareness and self-representation) and theory of mind (ToM) dysfunctions along with
the traditional positive, negative and cognitive domains. We review previous studies which
document the dysfunctions of self and ToM in schizophrenia together with neuroimaging
data that support the triple brain network model as a common neuronal substrate of this
dysfunction.
Keywords: schizophrenia, self, theory of mind, forward model, default mode network, salience network, central
executive network
INTRODUCTION: PHENOMENOLOGICAL DOMAINS OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia is a severe neuropsychiatric disorder with complex
manifestations expressed in a wide variety of symptoms tradition-
ally divided into positive and negative symptoms, and cognitive
deficits (Crow, 1985; Andreasen, 1999; Sass and Parnas, 2003).
Positive symptoms refer to phenomena exceeding normal mental
functions, such as conceptual disorganization, abnormal thought
contents and hallucinations. Negative symptoms are character-
ized by a decline in normal functioning, flattened emotions,
decrease of social behavior and anhedonia. Cognition is affected
in several domains such as attention/vigilance, psychomotor
speed, cognitive coordination, visual and verbal learning and
memory, working memory, executive functions and social cogni-
tion (Green et al., 2004). However, the common etiology of these
disparate symptoms remains elusive.
Recent phenomenological research indicates that disturbance
of the basic sense of self-awareness (core self) may be a core
phenotypic marker of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Nelson
et al., 2013, 2014). Self-awareness is an essential component
of more complex self-referential systems (self-representation).
The term “self ” refers traditionally to the human phenomenon
of one’s own experience including perceptions, thoughts, and
emotions (Vogeley and Fink, 2003). This intrinsic representation
(or meta-representation) of mental states as one’s own men-
tal states is paralleled by the representation of others, again
in terms of cognitive content (perceptions and thoughts) and
emotions (Vogeley et al., 2001). These cognitive and emotional
representations of others are linked to two domains of social
cognition, cognitively targeted “theory of mind” (ToM) and
empathy. To capture more clearly the dynamic features of a
complex self-concept, a two dimensional model of a human
mind’s representation could be delineated. The first dimension
of this model refers to the self-other distinction, and the second
represents the cognitive and emotional distinction (Figure 1).
In this context, we use the term “cognitive” for all processes
related to monitoring the perceptions, thoughts, planning and
action performance of ourselves or others. The term “emotional”
refers to the monitoring of motivational, positive and negative
(aversive) hedonic values automatically assigned to a current
situation or mental content. This model groups together four
domains (self, ToM, empathy and hedonic evaluation) with
one common denominator: meta-representation of the mind
(Figure 1).
Interestingly, all of these four categories have been identified
as dysfunctional in schizophrenia and represent an alternative
approach to schizophrenia phenomenology. It is tentative to
speculate that a common denominator could be a candidate
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FIGURE 1 | Model of a human mind’s representation
(inwards/outwards). The horizontal axis refers to “cognitive” dimension,
whereas the vertical axis refers to “emotional” dimension with stronger
motivational accent. We assume that these two axes can create a mental
representation of human mind, that can be focused outwards or inwards,
forming four domains: self, ToM, empathy and hedonic evaluation.
for a unified neurobiological mechanism underlying the wide
range of schizophrenia symptom manifestations. As we show
further in this paper, recent advances in neuroimaging have
proven that the array of bizarre perceptual experiences inher-
ent to schizophrenia, i.e., pathological beliefs and cognitive
deficits are part of the same core abnormality—prominent
disturbance in the orchestration of large-scale brain networks
that are conversely related to social cognition and emotional
valence evaluation (ToM and empathy) and self-attribution.
In order to explain co-occurrence of disparate symptoms of
schizophrenia, encompassing broad range phenomenological
domains, we have further elaborated the previously postulated
theory of the triple network dysfunctional theory (Menon,
2011).
In this article we focus on the disturbance of the cognitive
capability to represent ourselves/others as an unifying “super-
domain” in schizophrenia (Figure 1). The emotional domain will
be elaborated in a separate article. However, it is necessary to stress
that the disturbances of the poles of the emotional axis belong to
emotional flattening, a core negative symptom of schizophrenia
differing in an inward (anhedonia) and outward (poor rapport or
lack of empathy) perspective of reference.
This article aims to propose and advocate a concept of a
common neurobiological substrate for self and ToM and to doc-
ument its disturbance in schizophrenia. In the first two sections
we review previous studies which refer to the dysfunction of
self and ToM in schizophrenia together with neuroimaging data
elucidating the neuronal substrate of this dysfunction. Secondly,
we propose a triple network dysfunction as a candidate mecha-
nism for the deficit of self-awareness, autobiographical self and
ToM dysfunctions. Then, from this neurobiological perspective,
we provide support for the assumption that the disruption in the
orchestration of the triple network may underlie other prominent
domains of schizophrenia phenomonology as well.
SELF: SELF-MONITORING AND SELF-DISTURBANCE
In general, self is defined as an essential human phenomenon—
an intrinsic meta-representation of bodily and mental states (per-
ceptions, sensations, emotions and thoughts) that are experienced
as one’s own (Newen and Vogeley, 2003). Literature offers vari-
ous concepts of self, suggesting a plurality of this phenomenon.
Gallagher (2013) proposed a “pattern theory of self ”, an approach
allowing different aspects of self to coexist in parallel, in a “pat-
tern”, not exclusively. We use the term “self ” as a denomination
of the phenomenon itself. It is the most general term, linking and
including all other aspects of self.
For the purpose of this article we recognize self-awareness,
called “minimal” or “core self ” (also called “ipseity” from Latin
word ipse for “self ” or “itself ”), which refers to the fundamental
sense of self-presence, to the “center of existence as an indepen-
dent self-aware being”, to the ability to separate oneself from
others and to take a first person perspective (Sass and Parnas,
2003; Vogeley and Fink, 2003). Such perception of oneself as
an active agent of one’s own action is a central part of self-
consciousness (David et al., 2008).
In contrast, we use term “autobiographical self ” (Damasio,
1999) for a more complex phenomenon, based on autobiograph-
ical memory and on anticipation of a future, developing and
maturing gradually throughout a lifetime. It also underlies rep-
resentations of one’s own mental states, a process parallel to the
representation of the mental states of others (ToM). Newen and
Vogeley (2003) propose five different levels of complexity of self-
consciousness and emphasize the involvement of the minimal self
in each of them. Accordingly, we consider self-awareness (mini-
mal self) to be an intrinsic and essential component (prerequisite)
of autobiographical self, allowing the first-person perspective to
be taken in the representational processes.
The self-disorder or so-called ipseity-disturbance or ego-
disturbance is hypothesized to be a core impairment in
schizophrenia (Sass and Parnas, 2003; Sass, 2014). Self-awareness
disturbances (passivity phenomena), one of the hallmarks of
schizophrenia, are accompanied by a feeling of loss of one’s own
control and of being controlled by an external agent. This is com-
mon in patients suffering from false perception (hallucinations)
or from false beliefs (delusions).
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that a deficit in self-
monitoring could underlie abnormal perceptions and beliefs
behind other positive symptoms in schizophrenia, beyond the
scope of Schneider’s symptoms (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). Recent
evidence at a meta-analytical level has shown that a deficit in
self-monitoring is associated with auditory hallucinations per se
(Waters et al., 2012). Congruently, the impairment in the sense of
agency is present in schizophrenia patients even without first-rank
symptoms (Franck et al., 2001). Anomalous self-related experi-
ences frequently precede the onset of psychosis by many years
(Schultze-Lutter, 2009). In addition, self-monitoring deficit is
detectable also in unaffected siblings of patients with schizophre-
nia (Hommes et al., 2012). Those findings indicate that the
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deficit in this domain would belong to the endophenotype of
schizophrenia.
It has previously been proposed that self-disturbance
phenomena—delusions of alien control and thought insertion—
can be caused by a distraction of the so called “forward model”
(Frith et al., 2000; Frith, 2005; Leube et al., 2008). The forward
circuit is a mechanism that allows us to distinguish between
our own actions and actions initiated by an external source.
The concept has been initially documented in motor-system
control, in which two complementary elements were identified.
The inverse model (“controller”) provides motor commands
to perform a sequence of actions determined by an intended
goal. The forward model (“predictor”) allows us to represent
predicted consequences of actions. It creates an “efference copy”
processed in parallel with the motor action (Wolpert and Kawato,
1998; Blakemore et al., 2000; Frith et al., 2000; Leube et al.,
2008). In healthy subjects, self-monitoring could be based on
a comparatory system computing the deviation between the
predicted and the perceived consequences of both physical and
mental actions. If there is no deviation between predicted and
perceived, the action is experienced as self-initiated. Patients
with self-awareness-disturbances have problems to correctly
comparing predicted and perceived consequences and therefore
they misidentify their own acts as external intervention (Leube
et al., 2008).
Several brain regions have been assigned a role in this
automatic self-referencing mechanism. Functional brain imaging
studies confirmed that self-related processing may be specifically
mediated by cortical midline structures (CMS) and insula. Several
meta-analyses have demonstrated a predominant involvement of
the anterior and posterior CMS (anterior and posterior cingulate,
precuneus, the hubs of the default mode network (DMN)) in
the processing of self-specific stimuli that occur across various
functional domains in healthy subjects (Vogeley et al., 2001;
Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2010; Qin and Northoff,
2011; Murray et al., 2012).
Although neuroimaging data of self-processing in schizophre-
nia are sparse, Farrer et al. (2004) demonstrated clear func-
tional differences between schizophrenia patients with positive
symptoms and healthy subjects in the action-attribution test.
In this task the level of the subject’s control of a virtual hand
on a computer screen could be modulated by the experimenter.
Positron emission tomography showed that the activity of the
insular cortex along with right angular gyrus in healthy subjects
correlated with the individual’s control of a movement of the
virtual hand. In contrast, schizophrenia patients did not show
such a pattern of activity (Farrer et al., 2004).
In addition to forward system theory, some authors proposed
an alternative explanation of the self-disturbance in schizophre-
nia. Three complementary aspects that manifest differently in
the disease have been suggested (Sass and Parnas, 2003; Sass,
2014): (a) “Hyper-reflexivity” relates to an exaggerated form
of self-consciousness. The subject can project some aspects
of self-awareness onto external objects. (b) “Diminished self-
affection” in the sense of a decreased experience of existing as
an independent subject of awareness. This could be a source
of disruption of the first-person perspective in some cases of
schizophrenia disorder. (c) “Disturbed hold of the world” refers
to the “disturbance of the spatiotemporal pattern of the world”.
This disturbance could affect the organization and structure
of the field of awareness and a discrepancy between the per-
ceived, remembered and imagined (Sass and Parnas, 2003; Sass,
2014).
Sass and Parnas (2003) assume that the sense of self is a
deeply implicit phenomenon of the human mind and that there
is no need for a “separate channel of self-monitoring or a second
self-directed act of reflection”, as was proposed by Frith (1992).
Therefore, explicitly focused attention on an implicit experience
could paradoxically lead to a sense of “alienation” that is often
present in schizophrenia.
THEORY OF MIND
Humans have adopted the strategy to represent, anticipate and
think about the mental states of others. This ability, referred to
as the ToM or mentalizing, allows us to attribute and model
the mental states (perceptions, motivations, knowledge, beliefs,
emotions) of others and to predict their behavior. The term
“theory of mind” was first introduced by Premack and Woodruff
(1978). Initially, this term comprised the representation of the
mental states of both ourselves and others. However, there is
still an on-going and widespread discussion about the relation
between self, a meta-representation of our own mental states
(Vogeley et al., 2001), and ToM; and to what extent self is involved
in the modeling of the mental states of others and vice versa
(Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006).
Despite the variability in studies of ToM related neuronal
activation and its abnormalities in schizophrenia, the most fre-
quently replicated findings of these studies involve regions of the
prefrontal area, the temporo-parietal junction and the middle
brain structures (for review see Bosia et al., 2012).
In addition, Vogeley et al. (2001) demonstrated that ToM
(representation of other’s mental states) and SELF (representation
of one’s own mental states, a process parallel to ToM) capacities
rely on both different and common neuronal mechanisms. While
the ToM capacity predominantly activates mPFC along with the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the SELF capacity particularly
activates the precuneus, bilaterally. In addition, an area within the
right prefrontal cortex is particularly activated during conditions
when an integration of ToM and SELF is demanded. Although
ToM and SELF tasks also partly activate different brain regions,
common brain areas are involved in both tasks.
It was demonstrated that the CMS including the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC) and ACC are mainly activated in both
processes, i.e., during self-referential processing (evaluation of
one’s personality traits) as well as during third-person perspec-
tive taking or meta-cognitive representations (“thinking about
thinking”) (Amodio and Frith, 2006; D’Argembeau et al., 2007).
Interestingly, the degree to which the rostral part of mPFC was
activated while processing others’ personality traits correlated
with the degree of similarity perceived between one’s own and
others’ characteristics (Benoit et al., 2010). Mars et al. demon-
strated in their meta-analysis that the brain regions involved in
higher-order social tasks overlapped partly with the DMN, which
is connected with self-referential processes.
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These findings support the concept that self-referential (self-
reflection) processes are employed also while thinking about other
persons, where own person is used as a model for the evaluation of
others. Mitchell et al. (2005) suggest that self-reflection is used to
infer the mental states of others when they are sufficiently similar
to one’s own. This “social loop” is closed with the second level
of self-referencing, when thinking about our reputation, which
requires us to produce a representation of attributes that others
apply to us (Amodio and Frith, 2006).
Essentially, regardless of the mechanism involved, available
evidence suggests the importance of self-awareness processes in
the representation of one’s own mind (self) as well as in the repre-
sentation of the minds of others (ToM). This concept parallels the
fact that self-awareness, as a main component of self and also self-
recognition (Irani et al., 2006), together with ToM are comparably
affected in schizophrenia (horizontal axis of Figure 1).
ToM abnormalities were monitored in schizophrenia over
the last few decades based on the difficulties in evaluating the
mental states of others involved in the communication process,
observed in some schizophrenia patients. Today, nobody argues
the presence of the mentalizing deficit in schizophrenia, which
was confirmed using various methodological approaches that can
be divided into three categories: (a) verbal paradigms—indirect
speech utterances (Corcoran et al., 1995), verbal jokes (Corcoran
et al., 1997) and storytelling tasks involving false beliefs or decep-
tion (Andreasen et al., 2008); (b) nonverbal paradigms—comics
strips or cartoon tasks (Sarfati et al., 1997), Mind in the Eyes test
(Irani et al., 2006; Pentaraki et al., 2012) and false-belief picture
sequencing task (Langdon and Coltheart, 1999; Brüne, 2003); or
(c) combined methods—movies with actors for the assessment of
social cognition (Montag et al., 2011), moving shapes paradigm,
where the visual observations of actions are described verbally
(Koelkebeck et al., 2010; Das et al., 2012; Pedersen et al., 2012) or
verbal ToM stories presented simultaneously with cartoons that
display the action occurring in the stories (Mazza et al., 2001).
Nevertheless, apparent variability in the applied methods has
led to high heterogeneity in the obtained findings, making the
investigation of the complex ToM deficit very problematic. The
large degree of heterogeneity of ToM findings could be explained
by the state variables and task differences, as was shown in
a meta-analysis (Bora and Pantelis, 2013). In addition, it was
demonstrated that the ToM deficit is not uniform in individual
patients and is distributed varyingly among different components
of ToM (Bosco et al., 2009). This opens the question of possible
associations between the ToM impairment and psychopathology
and/or cognitive functioning in schizophrenia. Nevertheless, the
persistence of the ToM deficits in remitted patients (even less
pronounced than in non-remitted ones) suggests that there are
traits related to mentalizing impairments in schizophrenia as well
as some potential effects of residual symptoms (Bora and Pantelis,
2013).
Several studies reported symptom specific ToM deficits by
dividing the symptomatology into three subgroups according
to the triadic domains model of schizophrenia (psychomo-
tor poverty/negative symptoms, disorganization and reality
distortion symptoms) (e.g., Mazza et al., 2001). Most studies
observed a more prominent ToM deficit in patients with severe
negative symptomatology or disorganization of thought and
speech (Sarfati et al., 1997; Sarfati and Hardy-Bayle, 1999; Mazza
et al., 2001). It was also demonstrated that some reality distor-
tions, especially persecutory delusions, could be related to the
ToM deficit (Corcoran et al., 1995; Mazza et al., 2001; Pousa et al.,
2008). A current study showed that while negative symptoms are
associated with a lack of mentalizing, positive symptoms such
as delusions were associated with another type of error, over-
mentalizing (Montag et al., 2011). Importantly, patients without
symptoms present at the time of testing showed normal ToM
performance levels (Corcoran et al., 1997).
Interestingly, some studies focusing on schizotypal traits in
clinical and non-clinical populations found the ToM deficit
in a healthy population with higher schizotypy (Langdon and
Coltheart, 1999). In addition, high levels of schizotypal traits
(such as social anxiety, constricted affect and no close friends)
have been shown to be important for the ToM performance in
schizophrenia patients (Irani et al., 2007) which is more promi-
nent than in their first-degree relatives (Irani et al., 2006).
Since mentalizing abilities demand some level of intact
cognitive processes, several studies are focused on clarifica-
tion of the relationship between the ToM deficit and a deficit
in cognitive functioning present in schizophrenia. The poor
ToM performance was demonstrated to be strongly associated
with Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and measured cognitive per-
formance, especially executive abilities (Abdel-Hamid et al.,
2009) or working memory load (Brüne, 2003). However,
importantly, some studies controlled for cognitive performance
and IQ levels showed that the ToM deficit cannot be com-
pletely explained by the impairment of cognitive function-
ing in schizophrenia itself (Brüne, 2003; Bozikas et al., 2011;
Montag et al., 2011; Pentaraki et al., 2012). A systematic
review of the relationship between ToM and executive func-
tions confirms the idea that the impairments in ToM and
executive functions are independent of one another (Pickup,
2008).
TRIPLE NETWORK DYSFUNCTION: A CORE OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA?
Over the past few years the focus of neuroimaging research
has shifted from the localization of task-related neural activity
towards functional connectivity within and between organized
cerebral networks. A wealth of data based on temporal coupling
of fMRI responses during rest and context/stimulus-dependent
activations has identified a triple large-scale brain network model
consisting of the default mode network (DMN), salience net-
work (SN) and central executive network (CEN; Menon, 2011;
Figure 2). It is widely accepted that coordination of these net-
works plays a key regulatory role in organizing neural responses
underlying fundamental brain functions.
The DMN shows decreased activation during cognitive
task performance relative to resting-state or internally focused
tasks and is implicated in self-referential internal mentation
(Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Its subsystems include CMS, i.e.,
mPFC, posterior cingulate cortex and adjacent ventral pre-
cuneus, along with the medial, lateral and inferior parietal
cortex and a part of the medial temporal lobe. The second
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic figure of the triple network model consisting of
the default mode network (DMN), salience network (SN) and central
executive network (CEN). According to this model, the anterior insula
(belonging to the salience network) activates the CEN and deactivates the
DMN in response to the salient stimuli. Legend: ACC: anterior cingulated
cortex, DPLFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, PPC: posterior parietal
cortex, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, PPC: posterior cingulate cortex,
INS: anterior insula. Adapted from Menon and Uddin (2010); Sridharan
et al. (2008), the images of networks derived from our in house resting
fMRI sample, n = 20.
network—CEN—engaged in externally oriented attention during
demanding cognitive tasks, includes primarily the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and posterior parietal cortex (PPC;
Menon and Uddin, 2010). In general, cognitive states that acti-
vate the DMN typically deactivate the CEN and a vice versa.
The last large-scale SN, composed of the anterior cingulate and
the anterior insula, mediates selection of salient external and
interoceptive signals (Sridharan et al., 2008; Menon and Uddin,
2010).
Accumulating evidence from neuroimaging studies in healthy
individuals indicates that SN causally influences anticorrelated
activation of DMN and CEN. The existing evidence supports a
general role for the SN in switching between these two networks
upon salient stimuli mediated by midbrain dopaminergic input
(Menon and Uddin, 2010). The aberrant orchestration within
the triple network model has been suggested as a backbone for
some clinical and cognitive features of various psychiatric and
neurological disorders (Menon, 2011).
In this section, we examine how large-scale brain net-
works provide integrative albeit rather mechanistic models of
schizophrenia psychopathology, traditionally clustered into pos-
itive, negative and cognitive domains. Furthermore, we empha-
size a great deal of evidence accumulated over the last decade
suggesting that insula/ACC i.e., SN dysfunction is a unified cause
of brain-network disturbances observed in schizophrenia. Finally,
we propose that deficits in coordination of these neurocogni-
tive networks in schizophrenia may underlie a disruption in
self-related functions that causes and also antecedes a disparate
assortment of signs and symptoms encompassing such distant
phenomena as first rank symptoms and impaired social cognition.
As a starting point, we take into consideration numerous
resting-state and stimulus-evoked fMRI measurements in patients
with schizophrenia compared to healthy controls that repeatedly
showed aberrant functional connectivity within and between
DMN, SN and CEN (White et al., 2010; Camchong et al., 2011;
Kasparek et al., 2013; Moran et al., 2013; Orliac et al., 2013;
Palaniyappan et al., 2013; Guo et al., 2014a; Manoliu et al., 2014).
Those results converge on the conclusion that SN dysfunc-
tion may be causative to triple network dysfunction inherent to
the illness (Palaniyappan et al., 2012b). Indeed, based on non-
psychiatric lesion studies, it was clearly shown that structural SN
integrity plays a crucial role in the fine-tuned orchestration of
the other two major brain networks (Zhou et al., 2010; Bon-
nelle et al., 2012). This gains particular importance considering
concentration of the most often reproduced structural deviations
in schizophrenia in regions of insula and ACC, which represent
key hubs of SN. A prominent gray matter reduction within
these structures has been consistently and robustly reported in
the meta-analyses of morphometric MRI studies (Glahn et al.,
2008; Ellison-Wright and Bullmore, 2010; Bora et al., 2011;
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Shepherd et al., 2012). ACC and insula gray matter volume
reduction precede the occurrence of the first psychotic symptoms
and thus represent candidates for trait symptoms of the disease.
A transition to psychosis and further chronicity is associated with
additional morphological changes in the adjacent regions of the
mediofrontal cortex and the temporal lobe. (Chan et al., 2011).
Further, an impaired anti-correlated relationship between
task-positive CEN and task-negative DMN due to SN malfunc-
tion may be phenotypically expressed as major symptoms of
schizophrenia. Firstly, the existing data provide an explanation of
a fundamental representation of positive symptoms: auditory ver-
bal hallucinations (AVH). Data obtained from a resting state fMRI
in schizophrenia patients suggest aberrant functional connectivity
between the DMN and CEN as a denominator of AVH sever-
ity (Manoliu et al., 2014). Additionally, one recent fMRI study
showed aberrant down-regulation of the DMN during a resting
state that was concomitant with spontaneous hallucinations in
schizophrenia, whereas overall spatial and temporal instabilities of
the DMN correlated with the severity of hallucinatory experience
(Jardri et al., 2013). This is of particular importance, since, as
noted above, a large number of studies using both resting-state
and task-related fMRI studies in healthy human subjects implicate
the main hubs of DMN as being key structures for “self ” as
opposed to “other” discrimination (van der Meer et al., 2010; Qin
and Northoff, 2011).
Therefore, keeping in line with this, the phasic hallucinations
may emerge from a spontaneous switching off of the dysregu-
lated and unstable DMN, secondary to SN dysfunction (Northoff
and Qin, 2011). This may result in a malfunction of this self-
attributional tagging system with a consequent misattribution of
internal mental states to an external source. Along a somewhat
different line, both structural and functional changes within the
SN key node, the insular region, correlate with the occurrence
of AVH in schizophrenia (Jardri et al., 2011; Palaniyappan et al.,
2012a) and positive symptoms in general (Moran et al., 2014).
Correspondingly, a putative consequence of SN dysfunction,
i.e., instability of DMN hub, correlates with overall positive symp-
tom severity in schizophrenic patients (Rotarska-Jagiela et al.,
2010). Correlation between illness duration, positive and negative
symptom severity and an altered DMN cortical midline system
has been further confirmed by combined resting-state fMRI and
voxel-based morphometry (Guo et al., 2014b).
That is to say that a precise interlink between a triple network
dysfunction and occurrence of positive symptoms, namely those
beyond boundaries of first-rank symptoms, remains unclear.
However, preliminary evidence suggests that the theoretical
account presented herein may be complementary with the previ-
ously postulated alteration of the dopamine-dependent process of
salience attribution in a psychotic state (Howes and Kapur, 2009).
Dopamine-mediated salience dysfunction hypothesis in a
psychotic state has been suggested as an underlying cause for
highly prevalent non-ego-disorder delusions, such as persecu-
tory delusions and delusions of reference, whereas the theory
appears at first sight less applicable to ego-disturbances inher-
ent to first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia. Nevertheless, those
disparate delusional phenomena may share the same mechanism.
In a fMRI study, heightened self-relevance to ambiguous stimuli
in patients with schizophrenia with delusions of reference
compared to controls was associated with an increased blood-
oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrast imaging response in
DMN hubs as well as insula (SN) and midbrain dopaminergic
regions (Menon et al., 2011). This finding suggests a direct
link between dopamine-dependent aberrant salience and recruit-
ment of main DMN cortical midline regions in heightened self-
relevance that is thought to underlie delusions of reference.
On top of that, the activity in insula and ventral striatum
correlated with the strength of this particular type of delusions
in patients.
It is tempting to conclude that following a continuum model
approach, the same neural dysregulation within large scale brain
networks may, on the one hand, underlie the sensation of delu-
sions of reference and, on the other hand, lead—on its extreme
end delusional alienation—to mental processes resulting in first
rank symptoms of schizophrenia. This assumption is in accor-
dance with the recent shift from a categorical to a dimensional
concept of schizophrenia. It is in a general agreement with a
factor analysis carried out in a large cohort of psychotic patients
(Peralta and Cuesta, 2005). Based on this study, schizophrenia
may be viewed as the “end-stage” disease or the extreme pole of
the psychotic continuum. This and other evidence underline a
dimensional construct of schizophrenia and support the contin-
uum hypothesis of the psychotic illness.
Although the triple network theory provides a conceptual
framework for an integrative psychophysiological approach for
the study of a wide scope of positive symptoms, in the time being
it is unable to provide significant additional explanatory power
to the broadest context of schizophrenia-related variables, e.g.,
formal thought disorder, disorganized or catatonic behavior. On
the other hand it is capable of providing a theoretical ground for
a cognitive dimension of schizophrenia (Elvevåg and Goldberg,
2000).
It has been suggested that a lack of optimal DMN suppres-
sion during cognitive task engagement may be a source of the
general cognitive impairment (Anticevic et al., 2012). In previous
literature it has been proven that in healthy controls the mag-
nitude of task-induced deactivation within the DMN positively
correlates with cognitive performance (McKiernan et al., 2003;
Li et al., 2007). In schizophrenia, reduced suppression of the
DMN during various cognitive tasks represents a constant finding
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005; Garrity et al., 2007; Harrison
et al., 2007; Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al.,
2009; Nygård et al., 2012; Anticevic et al., 2013; Fryer et al.,
2013). Therefore, a breakdown in coordinated suppression of
DMN activity may impair the overall performance across various
cognitive domains in schizophrenia.
In line with the proposed role of SN structures in pathophysi-
ological processes related to cognitive dysfunction in schizophre-
nia, there is a direct interlink between morphology of insula and
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and a dysfunctional pattern of CEN
activation and DMN deactivation during working memory in
patients (Pujol et al., 2013). This is also in accordance with our
findings (Horacek et al., 2005) which suggest that the medial
forebrain pathways and cingulum bundle underlie the activity of
cortical structures required for Stroop test processing.
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Thirdly, deficits in social cognition (including ToM abilities)
have been well documented in schizophrenia using a wide variety
of tasks. Numerous studies suggested that brain areas associated
with the DMN, namely mPFC, are involved in this cognitive fac-
ulty that includes also ToM (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Schilbach
et al., 2006). This has been recently confirmed by an extensive
study that compared resting-state networks in healthy partici-
pants with brain areas showing consistent co-activation during
various task-based neuroimaging experiments archived in the
BrainMap database. The DMN was heavily tasked exclusively with
ToM and social cognition tasks (Laird et al., 2011). Concurrently,
the reverse approach has been applied in additional meta-analyses
of fMRI studies using the BrainMap database and likelihood
estimations of functional brain activity associated with either rest
or social cognition. Again, it has been shown that there is an
overlap between the “social brain network” activated during ToM
tasks and the DMN, both at the network level and at the level of
individual brain regions (Mars et al., 2012).
Further direct evidence of the crucial involvement of DMN
in theory of mind comes from a review performing a quanti-
tative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of ToM, using the
activation-likelihood estimation (ALE) approach (Mars, 2011).
Fourthly, an aberrant synchronization of large-scale networks
may underlie even a negative symptom dimension. Both func-
tional connectivity within and between distinct subsystems of the
DMN, SN and CEN were calculated and correlated in a resting-
state fMRI study. Internal functional connectivity between the
SN and CEN correlated with the severity of negative symptoms
in patients with schizophrenia (Bosia et al., 2012; Manoliu et al.,
2013).
To sum up, meta-analyses targeting consistent activations
across studies exploring the neural correlates of self (self-
awareness and self-representation) and social cognition, namely
ToM revealed shared activations within CMS. This finding par-
allels the simulation theory of social cognition based on the
assumption that the same neural networks support thinking
about self and other people.
Additionally, a recent large meta-analysis aimed at the iden-
tification of brain regions, which consistently show activations
during social cognition, emotional processing and resting state
showed a close convergence within CMS as well (Schilbach et al.,
2012).
This study provides robust evidence for a shared neural
network consisting of mPFC and precuneus that underlies acti-
vations during various emotional and social cognition tasks
along with deactivations across different types of experimental
paradigms. Identification of a common neural denominator of
those seemingly disparate faculties brings some support to the
above-mentioned two dimensional model of a human mind’s
representation.
In cognitive terms a commonality may exist between all three
types of states, which could be termed “introspective processing”.
This specific mental faculty may represent a prerequisite for the
processing either of one’s own or other people’s states on both a
cognitive and an emotional level.
In schizophrenia, dynamic dysregulation of the CMS, which
is considered the strongest part of the DMN, may substantially
impair translation of cognitive processes from an internal to
an external focus. This might explain schizophrenia symptoms
related to defective self-monitoring, such as AVH or other
ego-disturbances represented by thought insertion or thought
withdrawal.
Nevertheless, an out of control increase in DMN activity
or a failure of DMN deactivation may underlie a wide array
of other schizophrenia symptoms, including non-ego-disorder
positive symptoms, overall cognitive dysfunction and negative
symptoms. Taken together, available evidence suggests a testable
hypothesis that on the neural level, impaired self-monitoring,
social and affective processing in schizophrenia converge and rely
upon an aberrant recruitment of large scale brain networks. Prin-
cipal causes may plausibly include impaired regulating machinery
underlying the fine-tuned orchestration of those neural networks.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This article aims to emphasize the concept of common self
and ToM mechanisms and their disturbances as a marker
of schizophrenia. We recognize the speculative nature of our
hypotheses. Our goal is to provide future directions for neurobi-
ological research in schizophrenia that extend beyond tradition-
ally studied phenomenological dimensions and regional specific
functional deviations. We propose an experimental approach
addressing behavioral and neuronal features in both self and ToM
paradigms in schizophrenia. This perspective provides us a novel
direction to study not only brain and behavioral alternations in
schizophrenia but also mutual relations between self and theory
of mind, e.g., the possible role of the forward system in more
complex processes. This approach reflects cumulating evidence
of a disordered integration of large-scale brain networks as a
critical pathophysiological mechanism underlying heterogeneous
symptomatology in schizophrenia.
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